Understanding Role of Security Dilemma in South Asia: Implications for Strategic Stability

Abstract

Security Dilemma is a phenomenon in International Relations most typically associated to Realist School of thought and particularly to Structural Realism. It is a concept that entails a predominant notion that states in global international structure rely on their own potentials and considering that realist international order is anarchic, there are often chances where relative gains of one state prejudice relative gains of another. Security Dilemma is a byproduct of actions and reactions of contending state actors built around their national security architecture. It can be understood to be a combination of strategic decision-making and fractures therein caused by reciprocating maneuvers by adversaries. Security dilemma in international relations has taken roots from the Cold War where bipolarity was seen as a potent equalizer through brinkmanship. Security dilemma in such Cold War context was built around Massive Retaliation Doctrines being too vulnerable to avert risk reduction and a total erosion of deterrence capability and credibility. Pakistan and India, have often relied on Cold War stratagem to achieve their strategic equilibrium which makes up a dominant portion of South Asia’s security dilemma. In this paper, we will examine the paradigms of Security Dilemma and prospective strategies to manage the spiral effect on strategic equilibrium in South Asia. This paper will also place focus on various instances where Security Dilemma remained operable and played a role in transformation of strategic dimensions between Pakistan and India. The aim of this research is to operationalize the necessity of security dilemma oriented reactionary responses in South Asia and the consequent effect on bilateralism between Pakistan and India. The paper will rely on constructivism and structural realist paradigms to understand state behavior from a communicative standpoint.