Asymmetric Rivalry in a Fragmented Security Complex: Historical Constraints on China-US Competition in the Middle East

Abstract

China-US strategic competition increasingly shapes global politics, yet its regional manifestations vary significantly. Why has the increasing competition failed to lead to bipolar realignment in the Middle East? Most existing realist and power-transition schools of thought predict hegemonic substitution whenever a new power faces an existing hegemon. However, despite the increased intensity of Chinese economic participation, the primacy of the United States military remains intact, and no regional actor is willing to commit to exclusive alignment with either power. This article argues that the China-US competition in the Middle East is limited structurally due to the patterns of external penetration that have deep roots in history and have created a fractured regional security complex. The article shows that security externalisation has been institutionalised by colonial fragmentation, Cold War militarization, unipolar interventionism, and post-2011 multipolar layering, which increased the costs of hegemonic transformation. Therefore, the competition is observed in an unequal manner within different spheres: The United States preserves military superiority, but China increases its economic and infrastructure power. This balance is reinforced by regional states through hedging policies that do not allow bipolar consolidation. The results refine power-transition theory by specifying regional structure as an intervening variable and refine RSCT by theorising asymmetric great-power rivalry. The Middle Eastern example shows that systemic rivalry does not necessarily result in bipolarity, but instead that the history of the creation of regional environments influences the level and nature of the great-power rivalry.