

Issue of Democratic Accountability in the Contemporary History of Pakistan (1999-2008) Challenges and Prospects

Syed Fakharuddin Shah

Associate Professor

Higher Education Department, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

comCorrespondence: Sfshah2015@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Political accountability is generally, in the context of a democratic state, related to issues, for instance, how elected representatives can be made responsible for their exercise of power and policies. The aim of this research is to establish the meaning of the phenomena of political accountability in the contemporary perspective of Pakistan. The Grounded theory as a method is used on archival data and interviewing. Political elites split off to join the spoils system of Musharraf regime in return for the accretion for power and kept themselves safe from accountability process, which was very selective, discriminatory, and politically-motivated, initiated by the Musharraf government. Their preoccupation was with ruler ship rather than the electorate as citizens. In this classical cycle of client list politics, the government from top to the bottom was embedded in the notion of rewarding their 'clients' rather than their principal actors of political accountability, i.e. the citizens.

Keywords: *Electoral accountability, clientelist accountability, patron-clientist politics*

Introduction

Horizontal and vertical political accountability

Accountability has transpired as a vital pillar to the modern political concepts of good governance, democracy, and election (Bovens, 2010). Accountability is originally and intrinsically a democratic idea. Being accountable, in a broader sense, means a positive reciprocity between accountor and accountee that exists everywhere, either in private matter or public domain. O'Donnell (1998) suggested that accountability is divided into two sub-categories, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal accountability portrays relationship between equals, like the relationship between the legislative, executive, and judicial sectors in the checks and balances structure. Vertical democratic accountability describes a relationship between un-equals, between principals and agents in the shape of contractual political empowerment in which political power is derived from the people (Gailmard, 2014). The basic role of accountability mechanism is to control the abuse of power and maintain the rule of law. (Mansbridge, 2014). Basically, elections are seen as one of the main democratic accountability devices to make the accountable responsible (Ferejohn 1986; Przeworski et al. 1999). Noticeably, all these mechanisms provide institutionalized foundation to ensure the operation of democratic accountability. According to the above discussion, it is clear that democratic accountability inclines to political and institutional standards to get certain level of democratic legitimacy.

An institutional and principal–agent approach to democratic accountability

Accountability as a democratic norm (Bovens, 2010) stipulates that elected representatives and public officials are duty-bound to give truthful information to the public. Information and expertise are a source of power for agents (Gailmard, 2014). Political systems may create fallacies about themselves to create a belief in their legitimacy and to get obedience (Weber 1978: 213). An institutional approach to democratic accountability analyses the possible divorce of rhetoric and practice and highlights how a polity practically functions, its capabilities and capacities, and standard operating mechanism (March 1984). Such ideals are, however, sometimes unrealistic and impossible to achieve in practice (Cyert & March, 1963: 43-117).

Within a principal–agent approach institutions are often considered as tools for redressing problems of accountability caused by representative settings (Warren 2011: 523, 526). Delegating discretion is essential, but checks and balances are embedded in the shape of electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic settings, in processes of selecting agents, monitoring modes, reports from agents and, punishment for misuse of powers and distorting facts (Waterman and Meier 1998). Where as the institutional approach visualizes the political role of citizens and elected representatives as more limited. Ideals of political equality, majority government, and non-elected officials subordinated to elected representatives are difficult to fulfill. Equality of control and check is a constant battle “always on the verge of being lost” (Dahl and Lindblom 1963: 282), not a firm equilibrium. There is the doubt that influential actors are not properly held accountable. The influential actors do not come up to their obligations to principals who lack the capacities to call them to account. If accountability holders are not strong, the accountability processes that depend on them are compromised to great extent (Rubenstein, 2007).

Dynamics of political accountability in the developing societies

In developed and legitimate political system, accountability mechanism is highly institutionalized and routinized (Holmberg & Rothstein 2012). In developing political system, reflected by weak or contested institutions, accountability processes are more likely to be controversial, politicized and selective (Thompson 1987: 40). Citizens may not have the resources and capacities necessary for demanding, assessing, and sanctioning agents' accounts.

Democratic Accountability and the role of the citizens

Popular rule and sovereign will of the people are expressed, implemented, and enforced through free Democratic Accountability (Goodin, 2008:178) for example, parliamentarianism (Strom, 2000). A representative assembly makes laws, delegate authority to government officials, and holds them accountable. Laws are prepared and implemented by an executive accountable to the legislature. The problems exist on this account. The citizens without informed, consistent, and sound preferences are unable to perform responsibility and clap power holders to account. Political communication through new social media and mass media can misinform public opinion and obstruct rational reasoning and intelligent public opinion (Atle Hetland, Personal communication, June 25 2018).

Responsible- party model

Since 1950's the political science literature has been under the influence of "responsible party government" model. This model considers politics as the outcome of relations of the agents (candidates for electoral office, elected officials) and principals (citizens, voters), but the responsible-party model ignores different type of patronage-based polity in which party-voter and political elites- civil-military establishment linkage exists in many developing countries with different political impacts. In many developing political systems citizen- politicians' linkages and politicians- establishment relations are based on direct material benefits. Politicians are considered to be greatly prone to such material inducements and willing to surrender their loyalty for the vested interests.

Reconstruction of democratic accountability in the of Pakistan (1947-99)

The best accountability ground for the politicians or political parties is an election but Pakistani leaders could not learn the operation of political process of accountability in a democratic society. (Sayeed, 1966: 83). A national election might have created a national vision among political forces. (Afzal, 2002: 372). Moreover, the political parties made during this period were un- organized, ill-disciplined and fragmented. The political instability could have been averted by strengthening the political accountability through free political activities and conducting a general election. (Suhrawardy, 1957) (Cohen, 2012: 56) In contrast to politicians, the civil services and the army were long established institutions with the strength, discipline and expertise (Ziring, 1997: 99). Working under an elected authority was something new for them (Yusuf, 1999: 32). It was the viceregal polity which Pakistani military and bureaucratic elites inherited. And then have managed to carry it on after independence (T. Rehman, Interview, April 25, 2018). The process of democratic accountability got off the rails time and again by the military take overs. Thus the culture of political accountability did not flourish.

Controlled democratic Accountability

The experiment of controlled democratic accountability system by Ayub khan regime failed to train the people and their representatives for prompting the culture of political accountability. In fact it arrested genuine growth of politic of accountability because there was no free political environment for the growth of effective, responsible and responsive governmental set-up (Ziring, 2001: 206).

Paradoxes of Political Accountability

The rise of the period of democratic accountability demonstrated, (1997-79) for the first time, the power of the ballot and the people brought political forces into the corridors of power with a hope to be responsive to their aspirations. In the absence of political accountability within political parties, leadership at various levels was nominated instead of being elected. The exercise of authority was personalized rather than institutionalized (I. Husain, Interview, and August 2, 2018). Political power was shifted from the people to political parties and from parties to their leaders, who towered over their party colleagues. The ambitious military was involved in dealing with political rivals. The military reasserted itself

in politics (Ziring, 2001: 479) and the democratic process of accountability was derailed (Hamid, 1979:168-169).

Undemocratic Accountability Regime again: 1977-88

The constitution was not abrogated but held in abeyance by General Zia-ul-Haq on 5th July 1977 (Laws Order, 1977). Elections were postponed. Person and party-specific accountability drive were initiated. (Staff Reporter, 1977).The so-called accountability process under Zia was very selective, discriminatory and based on personal vendetta of Zia against PPP and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (M. Azhar, Interview, March 16, 2018).

So-called democratic era of political accountability (1988-1999)

The end of so-called democratic era (1988-1999) had fallen prey to political confrontation and destabilization between the governments , the political opposition, the Prime Minister, and the President. While the ruling elites played their game of power, the institutions were the losers and the people as principal actor of political accountability suffered its repercussions. The four attempts at political reconstruction failed leading to disappointment among the people pertaining to their role as principal actor of political accountability.

Dilemma of legitimate political accountability (1999-2008)

Musharraf's regime confronted a dilemma of political legitimacy to its dictatorial rule. He, like his predecessors, pondered over the political maneuvering to find out the so-called way out for political legitimacy. He decided to hold referendum on 30 April 2002 (Referendum Order, 2002) and tried to legitimize it on the constitutional clause relating to the conduct of referendum to get public opinion on the matter of national interests (Constitution of Islamic of Pakistan, 1973). Musharraf announced that his referendum was legal and had constitutional safety (Hanif, 2002). Major political parties also rejected the amendments that no individual had any right to bring amendments in the Constitution as the constitutional amendments could be made only by the Parliament in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Constitution (Staff Reporter, 2002).

The credibility of the referendum was questioned because there were no electoral lists at the polling stations and every voter was free to cast as many votes as he can if desired. Despite such open freedom, few people availed the facility and the polling stations presented a deserted scene (M. Azhar, Interview, March 16, 2018). Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) declared that Musharraf had succeeded to obtain 97.5 percent out of a total of 43.39 million votes and turn out remained 71 percent (Rana, 2002). The independent sources contradicted the figures of the CEC and announced its own estimation that no more than 10 percent voters casted their votes (Interim Report, 2002). The Alliance for the restoration of Democracy rejected the Presidential referendum and termed it a complete farce and an insult to the nation (Jaffrey, 2002).

The basic motive of Pervez Musharraf was to obtain political legitimacy through referendum for its undemocratic regime in which he was bitterly disappointed. It did not have any legal and political standing. It was not free, fair and transparent (Atle Hetland, Personal communication, June 25 2018). It was largely rigged, manipulated and flopped drama. Importantly, despite the support of District

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Nazims and local councilors (Butt, 2002). It was widely boycotted by the people of Pakistan.

Legal Framework order versus the parliamentary system of political accountability

After the controversial referendum, Musharraf decided to amend the Constitution to stabilize his hold on power. He had been given these powers in Zafar Ali Shah's case by the Supreme Court. There was widespread criticism against the constitutional engineering of Musharraf regime. The lawyers' community rejected the constitutional scheme on the ground that Musharraf did not have any political legitimacy to amend the Constitution. The Constitution could not be subjected to the whims and wishes of a military ruler or his junta (Zaman, 2003). Notwithstanding of the condemnation of the constitutional package, Musharraf went ahead to promulgate Legal Framework Order on 21 August 2002 (LFO, 2002). He declared that there was no need to get it validated from the Parliament (Sheikh, 2002). President Musharraf set aside the critics and justified Legal Framework Order to restructure the polity in 'the greater national interest' and for making the system functional and stable one (Staff Reporter, 2002). No doubt, the proposed amendments in the Constitution would undermine the parliamentary system of political accountability.

a) Revival of Article 58(2) (b), empowering the president to exercise discretionary power of dismissing the National Assembly and the central government, harmed parliamentary form of political accountability. It was not aimed at balancing the powers between the offices of President and Prime Minister, but checks on the exercise of powers of the latter (Butt, 2002).

b) Forming the National Security Council (NSC) in the Constitution including Chiefs of armed forces, Politicians, as an agent and principal actors of political accountability, came under the influence of an unelected institution.

c) Continuation of Musharraf as President in uniform, holding political office as well as an office of profit in the services of Pakistan, was violation of democratic norms of political accountability. (Constitution of Islamic of Pakistan, 1973).

d) Making significant laws relating to accountability, elections, local governments and so on, the part of the Sixth Schedule, deprived the most important organs of political accountability (Parliament and Provincial Assemblies) of their basic task of legislation.

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Discussion

Patron-Client Politics of Accountability during Musharraf regime

a. Non- party based Local Bodies and clientelistic electoral politics

Musharraf's October devolution plan aimed at making communities more participatory and responsible in determining their future (Ziauddin, 2002). Local leadership would be accountable and responsive to their local constituents of their authorities and actions (Local Government Plan, 2000). However, local elections without political party undermined the basic norms of political accountability. It also took power away from the provinces to the center while no solid steps were taken to handle corruption. Clear accountability mechanism at a grass-roots level was not adopted rather it was used to strengthen military rule (Mubarak Ali, Interview, February 25 2018). However, the devolution plan was designed to get legitimacy and survival for the military rule. All major anti-Musharraf regime political parties and civil societies expressed strong disapproval of it (T. Rehman, Interview, April 25, 2018). It was regarded a sort of democratic facade to provide political legitimacy to the undemocratic rule (Amir Mir, 2000). The political parties and civil societies blamed authorities' interference particularly in the election of district and tehsil Nazims. They were of the view that government had rigged and manipulated the elections for the offices of Nazims and Naib Nazims. Pervez Musharraf attempted to legitimize his undemocratic rule by passing the accepted party-based process of electoral accountability at the grass-root level (Cheema, 2006).

The military used the newly installed nazims as its clients to make sure favorable results in the upcoming Presidential referendum and pro-regime political parties in the general elections. They were convinced or forced to activate their constituents for a pro-Musharraf political forces. (Mubarak Ali, Interview, February 25 2018). The local government officials were tilted towards the military rule during presidential referendum of April 2002 and the October 2002 general elections. These political maneuverings of the government led to the creation of political clients to marginalize political rivals. Another important issue with regard to the devolution plan was the absence of an adequate system of checks and controls between and across the different the local governments. That strategy of clientelism by the patron regime resulted in lack of accountability process of district nazims, the provincial Local Government Commission could begin accountability of district governments but it could not be considered as an adequate alternate to institutionalized accountability of district government. Party-based, direct elections for local bodies were very crucial if there was to be electoral accountability of local officials (Z.Hussain, Interview, April 26, 2018). That was why Musharraf's local government scheme had failed to give any lasting political legitimacy to its military rule. The independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) brushed aside the government's devolution plan on the ground that its main objective was to depoliticize governance and to get relief for the undemocratic government in the veil of democratic façade (I.Shahid, Interview, July 5, 2018). The Commission suggested the military-led government to arrive at consensus with political parties pertaining to the restoration of real democratic set-up in the country (HRCP, 2000). Mohammad Waseem (2001) said that:

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“The non-party elections for district councils have destroyed the organizational credibility and institutional ethos of political parties. Compromised candidates of expedient multi-party alliances will neither represent policies nor issues nor ideologies”.

Once the military government chose PML-Q as favorite to military regime, the local elections became merely a spring board for creating party-less clients that could be politicized and manipulated when the Patron regime required its support. Thus, it is not amazing that controversies dominated political horizon among political parties, provincial executives and the bureaucrats (M.Azhar, Interview, March 16, 2018).

Flawed General Elections, 2002 and Electoral Politics of Clientelism

Conduct of General Elections Order, 2002 was proclaimed on 27 February 2002 by the Musharraf government (Chief Executive's Order, 2002). Musharraf enforced a number of executive steps, to consolidate his illegitimate rule which were anomalous in parliamentary norms of political accountability. According to Chief Executive Order, anyone who had served twice as Prime Minister of Pakistan could not hold the office again. That obstructed both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan (Chief Executive's Order, 2002). The Conduct of General Elections Order, 2002 made bachelor's degree mandatory for elected offices. The ECP accepted madrasa certificate as the equivalent to the bachelor's degree to benefit the religious-political parties. The military regime, under its patronage, allocated massive fund to pro-government Nazims to maximize the chances of electoral victory of its political clients (Waseem, 2002). The National Accountability Bureau was also employed by the military government against political adversaries to defect to the King' party, PML-Q. (S. Rahman, Interview, April 10, 2018). The alliance for the restoration of democracy alleged the military government to pave the way for pro-regime political parties including Sindh Democratic Alliance, Pakistan Muslim League (Q) and the Pakistan National Alliance to win elections Thus, the elections of 2002 were extremely flawed and selectively rigged (Final Report, 2002). The ruling elites set aside these allegations of the opposition. However, it was an open secret that the government extended all kind of help to pro-regime's candidates. Before the general elections, the government included anti-PPP people of the Sind Democratic Alliance into the Sindh Cabinet (Staff Reporter, 2002). The chief election Commissioner, Justice Irshad denied blames that governmental authorities had affected the electoral process (Qasir, 2002). The opposition political parties and civil societies raised concerns about the credibility and neutrality of the Chief Election Commissioner. Ali, 2001).

Despite the patronage of the military junta, The PML(Q) did not succeed to get a simple majority and PPP won the highest number of votes in the elections. The ban on floor-crossing in parliament was suspended to permit defections from the PML (N) and PPP to PML-Q- led client alliance. The government's favorite political forces including MMA returned the electoral favor in supporting his Legal Framework Order in the Parliament (M. Ahmad, Interview, April 3 2018) The PML-Q- led alliance also validated the October coup and the seventeenth

amendment. Thereby Musharraf succeeded to retain the dual offices of President and Chief of Army Staff. Elections based on patron-client pattern in 2002 reduced citizen trust in the political accountability and undermined the political legitimacy of the political parties. Political parties and their leadership was as responsible as the military for the failure of political accountability based on the concept of Collective Goodness during Musharraf rule. Democratic institutions of political accountability were sidelined, dysfunctional, harmed and democratic values were ignored (B.Ayaz, Interview May 12 2018). They supported the military rule instead of rule of law (A. Raza, Personal Communication, 5 September 2018). The answer to political ills was laid in the genuine political accountability process in which the electorate could elect and eliminate politicians via the power of ballot box (Qurat-ul-Ain, Personal Communication, 14 August, 2018). Then the genuine representatives, as principal actors of political accountability, could ensure the accountability of executive and the government functionaries.

National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) and politics of Clientelism

Another political controversy emerged about the promulgation of National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). Under Article 89 of the constitution, the President of Pakistan imposed the NRO, (2007 vide Ordinance No. LX of 2007). It was period specific, purpose specific and people specific. The political scenario in which the ordinance had been enforced clearly indicated that it was the result of political deal was between the regime and the political forces to protect their vested interests (Zaafir, 2007). Later on, the Supreme Court struck down the NRO. Mushtaq Ahmad says “Accountability is not across the board. We as nation citizens want accountability for others, not for ourselves. Lastly, law of accountability is not generally accepted by those falling prey to it. “...Fundamental principle of law is that it should be accepted even by those who violate it...” (M. Ahmad, Interview, April 3 2018).

It was enforced by General Musharraf in order to strike a political deal with former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto (Shaikh, 2007). NRO gave indemnity to all who were accused of corruption and corrupt practices including politicians, businessmen and holders of public offices, etc. (Noorani, 2008). The government was empowered to withdraw the prosecution before the decision of the court is announced. It could also withdraw The persecution of an absconding accused could be withhold that had become a victim of political victimization in any case between January 1, 1986 to October 12,1999 (Shaikh, 2007). NRO apparently aimed at encouraging national reconciliation and promoting mutual trust. It was also enacted to enhance confidence among government functionaries and removed the traces of political feuds, victimization and discrimination (Shaikh, 2007). However, the critics were of the view that NRO was ill-considered, illogical because it was framed for specific- time period. Furthermore, it was promulgated to grant amnesty to the specific class of the accused (Abbasi, 2007). In fact, NRO was a marriage of convenience, Miss Bhutto stoke a deal With the military dictator to protect herself and made sure of her political party’s (PPP) unhindered access to the upcoming elections in Pakistan (Butt, 2007). General Musharraf too realized his regime’s inefficient accountability derive against the accused who allegedly did corruption either they were politicians or bureaucrats, etc. Unfortunately, the apex court led by Dogar d validated emergency and justified all actions taken by Musharraf (Khan, 2007). It also overturned the stay order against

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the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), given by Justice Chaudhary- led judges of the Supreme Court, reinstated the courts authority as well as other related offices to hear and decide cases under the said ordinance. This provided blanket cover to corruption and corrupt practices of the accused bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen, etc. of the country ((Mubarak Ali, Interview, February 25 2018); Z.Hussain, Interview, April 26, 2018).

Electoral politics of Clientalism

The first requisite of political accountability is to hold political leadership accountable to the citizens by regular, free, transparent, orderly and competitive elections. People delegate, through the votes, sovereign power to their elected representatives, who, in turn, are accountable to the voters at election time. There was dismal performance of Pakistani polity in this regard (Khalid, 2002).The independent Election Commission had lost its legitimacy when constitution remained suspended, held in abeyance and Marti law was imposed by General Musharraf (Abbasi, 2005). Anti-regime political parties and their leadership were discriminately coerced, banned, victimized (Benazir out of politics, 2002; Faction in Peoples Party, PP Patriot established, 2002).

Musharraf regime held controversial non-party basis local bodies elections and referendum (Jaffery, 2002).Anti-regime political leadership nearly of PPP and PML(N) was deprived of their role in politics (Benazir, Nawaz out of politics: president, 2002). Pre-polls rigging contained many overt and covert moves that regime makes to manipulate election results. It consists of providing funds from government exchequer or any other resources to a pro-regime client political party, popularly known as King's party (Alvi, 2002). It also included to bring about an alliance between pro- regime political parties and everything was done to smooth its way in to power, to involve intelligence agencies to influence polls results and initiation of very selective and discriminatory 'accountability' against anti-regime political forces (T. Rehman, Interview, April 25, 2018).The pro-regime political parties supported the ruling general for its disputed decisions of referendum and his election as a right political move to find out the consent of the citizens (Rehman, 2002).They termed it constitutional and legal (PPP Sherpao terms, 2002).However, the anti-regime forces rejected the referendum and regarded it unlawful and illegal (Yasin, 2002). Polling day rigging included harassing and intimidating opponents polling agents, casting fake votes, etc. Post-polling contained fraud in counting votes, electoral engineering by the officials charged with the task of conducting the polls were either incompetent or liable to pressure, obeying the instructions from the high- ups (Z.Hussain, Interview, April 26, 2018).

The role of Parliament as the larger part of accountability mechanism

Parliament formed a part of the larger accountability mechanism. Its important function was to scrutinize public expenditure and consideration of the audit reports prepared by the Auditor General of Pakistan, the other two being legislation and representation (F. Khan, Personal Communication, October 10, 2018). Each parliamentary committee had the power to receive public appeals, undertake probes, summon public officials and recommend appropriate action. Parliament, in fact, was intended to play vital role in strengthening the rule of law and accountabilitypractice (M. Ali, interview, February 25, 2018). At a fundamental

level, parliament was supposed to frame an effective and robust legal framework of accountability but in Pakistan that expectations are not met by it. Muhammad Ayub says “During the military regimes of General Musharraf, Public Accounts Committee PAC), which was a forum responsible for ensuring accountability, comprised nominated members who were either retired bureaucrats or others randomly picked individuals from different segments of society. Civilian regimes did not fare better as chairpersons of the PAC used to be selected from among the treasury benches. This was contrary to the Best International Practices where Chairpersons are from opposition and members from both treasury as well as opposition benches to ensure neutrality so that the Public Accounts Committee functions in a non-partisan manner and its members remain above political divide. Moreover, PAC had not been fully empowered to implement its recommendations. As a result, its role is recommendatory. It only recommended actions but their implementation rests with the executive” (M. Ayub, Interview, May 20, 2018). Parliamentary committees are regarded as the most operative tools of accountability all over the world. Regrettably, parliamentary committees in Pakistan, despite their powers, both at the federal and provincial level have not been very successful (Klasra, 2008). The main issue was that leaders at the top, grasp all the levers of decision-making making the legislature, party organizations, and the parliamentary committees almost useless (Mehboob, 2017).

The relationship between the power political elites and common man was exploitative and manipulative in nature. Thus, under the exploitative power structure in Pakistan, the common man could not take independent decision in making political dominated class accountable in real sense. Parliament formed a part of the larger accountability mechanism. It had failed to function as watchdog on the actions of the executive and restraining it from exercising misuse of discretionary powers. Its second function was to maintain checks and balances on the government and acted as a financial accountability actor considering the audit reports by the Auditor General. (M. Ayub, Interview, May 20, 2018; K. Qayum, Interview, 17 October, 2018).

It was undisputed reality that the performance of Parliament on this account has been remained dismal during Musharraf regime. The parliamentary committees, due to partisanship, could not exert a sobering pre-emptive influence on the government departments. Under the elected institutions, the process of external accountability took place in the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and other parliamentary committees of the Senate and the National Assembly. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was not sufficiently empowered like his counterparts in other Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) for the conduct of their statutory duties. It was still governed by Ordinance 2001, which had not yet been replaced by an Act of Parliament in line with best international practices and Acts of other advanced SAIs. PAC has not been fully empowered to implement its recommendations (K. Qayum, Interview, 17 October, 2018). As a result, its role was recommendatory. It only recommended actions but their implementation rested with the executive. It was distressing that elections opportunities for consolidating democratic values of accountability had been squandered by the political parties. The ruling civilians governments had been remained very selective, partisan and discriminatory with regard to the so-called process of accountability and dispensing the justice. Moreover, the periodic direct or indirect

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interventions in the political process by the military partially stifled the growth of democratic institutions of accountability in Pakistan (M.Ali, interview, February 25, 2018). Whereas lack of intra-party accountability, advancement of personal and parochial interests of the political elites, partisan use of the accountability institutions, and dynastic politics had equally played important role in eroding the political institutions of accountability.

The strategy for improved system of democratic accountability is to erode the monopoly of the economic and political power of the dominant political elites. If this will happen that can lead to strengthen party system, and rule of law and promotion of democratic accountability and dispensing social justice. The prospect of such an outcome may not spare strong in the short term but it would be mistake to minimize the stirring for imperceptible change in long term. The driver of the change in the existing patron-client politics of accountability can be emergence of middle class based in urban areas free from links of caste, creed, illiteracy, ignorance, poverty, and feudal subservience (M.Ali, Interview, February 25, 2018; (B.Ayaz, Interview May 12 2018).Once the elected representatives of, at least urban areas, come into power would be forced to be politically accountable to the electorate at large in real spirit. (M. Ayub, Interview, May 20, 2018).

Conclusion

Political accountability begins from within political parties. Unfortunately, political parties in Pakistan did not have intra-parties accountability mechanism during Musharraf regime. Unfortunately, political parties in Pakistan do not have intra-parties accountability mechanisms (Free, fair and transparent party polls).There are no competitors in real terms for high party positions. They have become safe havens of political dictatorship and the junior office holders of the political parties blindly obey their party bosses. The political parties have promoted feudal, moneyed, dynastic and clientalist politics. This behavior has damage the social accountability mechanisms in Pakistan, This dynastic and feudalistic trend in our politics has resulted in shifting loyalties to seek power and these trends have taken the politicians away from their commitment to public accountability. That is the reason that during the civilian regimes, the aspirations and expectations of the people have largely failed to be met by the holders of corridors of powers. Due to absence of real political accountability within political parties, politicians in turn have failed to conduct their proper role as principal and agent actors of greater political accountability. Political parties are not well-organized and are undisciplined to play an effective role in promoting a culture of political accountability. The political parties have remained selective on this account and victimized their political rivals. The political elites remained indulge in political conspiracies and entering unconstitutional deals with the dictators to fulfill their narrower interests.

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