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Dissatisfaction with procedural democracy and rise of populism: A case study of Pakistan

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Abstract

The study aims at analysing the causes of dissatisfaction of people towards the procedural democracy in Pakistan. Dissatisfaction with democracy is on the rise around the world and developing countries like Pakistan are no exception to this phenomenon. Pakistan oscillated between different form of political governance procedural democracy, bureaucratic control, military regime, civil martial law, and hybrid regime. This fluctuation in its political system only given roots to illiberal or procedural democracy rather than substantive one. This happened due to many socio-political, and economic reasons which created a perception of dissatisfaction among the general masses. This dissatisfaction also given a rise to populism in Pakistan in the form of a mainstream third political party. The research paper concludes its argument based on primary and secondary source of data.

Key Words: Procedural democracy, Dissatisfaction, Populism, Non-political actors, Pakistan.

Introduction

Dissatisfaction with democracy, especially in developed countries, is mainly based on inconsistent economic policies (Kitschelt, 2002). On the other hand, in developing countries like Pakistan, there are many aspects of dissatisfaction with democracy. Zakaria (1999), for instance, describes that Pakistan follows a procedural kind of democracy that emphasises processes such as elections, majority rule, coalition formations etc. However, the substantive aspect of democracy that relies on the protection of human rights, rule of law, the administration of justice and the provision of equal opportunities remains missing from the political landscape of Pakistan. Since its inception, Pakistan has been oscillating between different forms of government —authoritarian, democratic and hybrid. This game of power has severely constrained the growth of democratic norms, thus, creating instability and inconsistency in policy making and policy implementation. These discrepancies also resulted in economic fallout, bad governance, and mistrust among the people of Pakistan regarding political parties and traditional political practices. This distrust has ultimately manifested itself in the recent upsurge of the

phenomenon of populism in Pakistan's politics. People have shown their tilt towards the populist party, Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan- a cricketer turned politician. This was visible in the recent elections of Pakistan in terms of the voting behaviour of the people. For the first time, the turnout rose to 60.6 million bringing change and outcasting the old political players including the military establishment (Aljazeera, 2024). This research analyses and interprets recent elections held in Pakistan in 2024 in which the masses have rejected the monopoly of old political parties and non-political actors. The major objectives of this study are to find out why the people of Pakistan have shown dissatisfaction with the old political parties and actors; does this dissatisfaction stem from their flawed policies or the perception of people is tainted by the hues of populism?

Literature Review

The underlying principles of democracy presume that the government is accountable to its citizens, administers laws equally, transparent distribution of resources and equal opportunity for political participation (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). In procedural democracy excessive emphasis is given towards mechanisms and procedures through which political decisions are made (Gordon, 2001). Procedural democracy ensures the electoral process, the rule of law and the protection of civil freedom (Dahl, 1984). Contrarily, Crouch (2019) argues that procedural democracy highlights the importance and implications of formal mechanisms, for example, political campaigns, and elections that fail to ensure basic civil rights and freedoms. Zakaria (1997) claims this is an illiberal democracy that is the opposite of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is a political system marked by fair and free elections, rule of law, separation of power, and protection of basic freedom i.e., speech, assembly, religion and property (Zakaria, 1997). Whereas in illiberal democracy elections take place as the semblance of democracy but the rule of law, political freedoms and civil liberties are compromised and constrained (Zakaria, 1997).

There is overwhelming support for democracy in the world but the masses are not satisfied with democratic governments and regimes (Doorenspleet, 2009). Anderson & Tverdova (2003) claims that corruption is one of the major causes that undermine the values of democracy. In the presence of corruption, procedural and distributive fairness become unapparent (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). This creates an atmosphere of mistrust between the masses and elected legislative members and weakens the foundation of state institutions (Zakaria, 1997). This further exacerbates distrust as the political elite is not effectively held accountable for their malpractices (Kitschelt, 2002). Moreover, the neo-liberal policies which give more importance to the market economy over democratic decision-making become the reason for the marginalisation of economic classes, i.e.; inequality, and exclusion. This is one of the major causes of dissatisfaction towards procedural democracy. The redistributive policies of the democratic regime inhibit economic growth in developing democracies the demands of citizens grew rapidly which generates a high level of government spending, thus reducing the resources for investment (Krieckhaus, 2006). In such economic arrangements, the state policy is formed and influenced by interest groups who reap particularistic privileges which damage the overall structure and makeup of the economy (Krieckhaus, 2006).

Crouch (2019) describes that in democracies there arises a problem with the relationship between the people and the elected representative. The elected representative has temptations that include corruption, malpractices and the suppression of opposition. Another important variable that becomes the cause of dissatisfaction among people towards procedural democracy is the involvement of non-political actors, especially the military (Schedler, 2002). In developing nations, the transitions of authoritative governments through elections lead towards more authoritative control than to a substantive democracy, the involvement of the military in this arrangement is inevitable (Schedler, 2002). In procedural democracies, the elected officials perform as mere puppets where the string of power is attached to the military establishment (Shah, 2019). Shah (2019) states that the generals' tutelage aims to protect their interests i.e., defense budget, nuclear weapons, intelligence gathering, internal security, foreign affairs and vast commercial enterprises (p.2). Doorenspleet (2009) is of the view that new democracies are full of "dissatisfied democrats" who are strong supporters of democratic principles but are not satisfied with the way democracy is implemented in their countries (p.94). The dissatisfaction towards democracy leads to weak legitimacy, democratic instability, weak writ of the state and lack of public support (Almond, 1956). Thus, the result is chaos and anarchy (Doorenspleet, 2009).

Populism emerged with the democratisation of the nineteenth century (Urbinati, 2019). According to Urbinati (2019), the Oxford English Dictionary describes populism as something that "strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel that established elite groups disregard their concerns" (p.2). Scholars in political science perceived populism as a contesting phenomenon against representative institutions but also as a force to rejuvenate democracy (Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2005). The populist movement rests on the inclusion of ordinary people who feel disconnected and alienated from the political elite (Urbinati, 2019). Deiwiiks (2009) defined the characteristics of populism, first one is the presence of the masses. Secondly, populism demands the dissatisfaction of the masses with a particular group of people, e.g. the political elite, interest groups and non-political actors. Thirdly, populists claim that people were betrayed by the elite who used resources for their interests, therefore, the primacy of the people needs to be restored (Deiwiiks, 2009). Populism aims to fill the gap which exists between the masses and the powerful elite and demands political justice and legitimacy (Crouch, 2019). Norris (2020) contends that populism exploits that parliamentary and party politics simply fail to provide sufficient representation to the general masses and exists a cleavage between the promises made by the representatives and their actions. Contrarily, populism is a strategic movement which emphasises party structure, manipulation of institutions and procedures, and power of extreme majoritarianism. (Knight, 1999). Populism is a hostile movement that directs its energies against political establishment (Urbinati, 2019).

Populist leaders employ strategies to win the hearts and minds of people one of the strategies is to disseminate their ideas through mobilising media in order to highlight and form discontent against the traditional political leaders (Laclau, 2005). Digital media, particularly social media created fragmentation and polarisation in society with disinformation and populist actors effectively exploiting this space, this also creates trust issues regarding the state institutions (Norris, 2022).

Research Methodology

This research relies on a mixed method approach where primary and secondary data are used to answer the questions. Primary data is collected through a questionnaire to gauge the opinion of the masses about democratic dissatisfaction, whereas, secondary data is extracted from already published material, i.e., journal articles and books. The gap that this research aims to fill is whether the dissatisfaction towards procedural democracy leads to a populist discourse—moreover, discussing the case study of Pakistan related to its most controversial General Elections (2024) ever.

The research paper is going to test the following hypothesis:

1. The dissatisfaction towards old political parties and non-political actors is influenced by the failure of policies.
2. The dissatisfaction towards old political parties and non-political actors is influenced only by populism.

The questionnaire sample size is 153, and is subjective based on thirty-two questions, so descriptive statistics is used to infer the insights. Pakistan is going through the toughest phase, and many civil liberties are being restricted. Therefore, the limitation we witnessed during this research is that people are hesitant to fill out questionnaires and give opinions.

Research Questions

Why the people of Pakistan have shown dissatisfaction with the old political parties and non-political actors?

Does this dissatisfaction stem from their flawed policies or the perception of people is tainted by the hues of populism?

Pakistan as a Case Study

The people of Pakistan are dissatisfied with the procedural democracy because the heavy emphasis on the procedures shadowed the other part of it that emphasise rule of law, civil liberties and equal opportunities to all the citizen's (Khan & Khan, 2020). Traditional political parties Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) dominated the political corridors since the 1980s (Rahim, 2023). These parties created public distrust because of the lack of governance, corruption, flawed economic policies and malpractices (Mushtaq, Baig & Mushtaq, 2018). Siddiq (2019) argues that the corruption scandals of PML-N and PPP leadership eroded the public trust, such as the Panama Papers. Poor governance lead towards economic mismanagement that only focused on short-term structural reforms and exacerbated public trust deficit (van der Eng, 2024). Similarly, the fact that the old political parties are dynastical families contributed to the perception in people that they are doing power politics rather than addressing public problems, also restricting the entrance of general public in the political representation (Malik, Mirza & Platteau, 2021). This created a dissatisfaction within masses about the procedural democracy.

Waseem (2020) describes that the political parties in Pakistan follow "establishmentarian democracy" which refers that non-political actors especially the military of Pakistan exercise heavy influence in shaping political arena (p.273). The

military establishment in Pakistan especially since the first martial law of Ayub Khan exerted its control over the civilian governments with direct interventions and indirect interference, e.g., manipulating electoral process and decision making (Waseem, 2020). The recurrent praetorianism created an environment of political instability and crisis, however, the old political parties adopted two behaviours with the military, i.e., confrontation and accommodation but the results of latest elections prove that military is heavily supporting these parties to maintain their interests (Waseem, 2022; Patil & Sharma, 2024). Resultantly, the democratic development in Pakistan lead towards deinstitutionalisation of political parties, weakens democratic culture and prevents the growth of substantive democracy.


The dissatisfaction with the old political parties and the military establishment created a space for populism and this space is strategically utilised by Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) and Imran Khan. Critics often argue that the rise of PTI and Imran Khan is attributed to their rigid narrative and stance on the elite capture (Hassan, 2020). Javid (2019) argues that the rise of PTI and Imran Khan is evident because he resonated with the will of people as they are disillusioned with the policy failures, malpractices of traditional political parties and intervention of non-political actors. PTI and Imran Khan promised the general masses to improve the governance which was in deep shambles and this represents the desires and expectations of the people (Javid, 2019). However, the government tenure of Imran Khan witnessed severe challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, ineffective governance and (Zaman & Mansoor, 2024).

PTI and Imran Khan used media as a weapon to disseminate their ideology, narrative and stance. Imran Khan successfully utilised the efficacy of traditional modes of media to generate a public discourse not only nationally but internationally as well (Umber et al., 2024). Especially after his imprisonment Imran Khan remains in the news at local and international levels due to his upright stance against the manoeuvres of old political players and military establishment (Umber et al., 2024). Social media is utilised tactically by PTI and Imran Khan in order to mobilise the masses particularly youth and educated class (Yousafzai, Mahmood & Tabassum, 2014). Imran Khan effectively leveraged social media sites, i.e., Facebook, Twitter and Instagram to engage the masses, especially young groups in urban areas, however, this media strategy worked in rural areas as well. (Siddique, Mumtaz & Ali, 2020). This established an opinion among the masses that Imran Khan is a genuine alternative to traditional political parties, this digital strategy helped to foster a sense of political belonging among the young voters about progressive Pakistan (Yousafzai, Mahmood & Tabassum, 2014).

The danger of populist rhetoric is that Imran Khan adopted a confrontational style of politics which increased polarisation not only in Pakistan's politics but in the whole society (Fiaz & Nawaz, 2023). Khan's political discourse created a phenomenon of "us" vs "them" that is keep amplifying (Fiaz & Nawaz, 2023). Although it is a fact that PTI and Imran Khan forced the traditional political parties and the non-political actors to reevaluate their policies (Jalal, 2024). After the imprisonment of Khan, questionable election results and the political victimisation of PTI the national sentiment is strongly in favour of massive change against clientelism and Praetorianism (Jalal, 2024).

The General Elections of Pakistan (2024) can be referred as the preferred election because of the massive turnout. The political polarisation and victimisation, economic instability, and bleak security situation pulled highest turnout from young voters (Aljazeera, 2024). The election held at the time when Pakistan was facing its horrific economic crisis with inflation of around 35 percent (Aljazeera, 2024). Moreover, politically the biggest political party Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf is going through a massive political victimisation. Aljazeera (2024) stated that the interim government including the military establishment almost allocated \$850,000 for engineering the elections against PTI chairman Imran Khan.

Chart 1: Distribution of Registered Voters in the General Election 2024



The Election Commission of Pakistan (2024) provided a data that indicates that almost 128 million people have registered to cast their votes. Most of the registered voters are young as the chart given above clearly shows that young people have registered for voting that accounts for 66.3%. According to Asian Network for Free Elections (2024), 60.6 million voters exercised their voting rights on February 8, 2024, comparing with turnout of 54.8 million in 2018. However, the turnout increased but the elections widely nationally and internationally perceived as rigged due to engineering made by military and civil administration (Umber et al., 2024). The legitimacy of the current power structure is in severe question due to incredible elections, critics argue that in order to keep Imran Khan from politics who is posing

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a great threat to the interests of power elite and military establishment is the major reason of electoral engineering (Umber et al., 2024).

Analysis and Results of Questionnaire

Table 1: Age Group of Respondents

Age group	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
18-25	56	36.6%	36.6%
26-35	47	30.7%	67.3%
26-45	1	0.7%	68.0%
36-45	31	20.3%	88.2%
46-60	17	11.1%	99.3%
Other	1	0.7%	100.0%

The above table shows the breakdown of respondents' age groups linked with counts, percentages and cumulative. The largest group of respondents falls within the age group of 18-25 with 56, constituting 36% of the total. On the other hand, 47 respondents belong to the age group of 26-35 constituting 30.7% of the total and 31 respondents belong to the age group of 36-45, constituting 20.3 % of the total. Meanwhile, 17 respondents belong to the age group of 46-60 contributing 11.1% of the total and other that means people above 60 constitute 0.7 % in data. This shows that younger people dominated the questionnaire and were more interested in giving opinions.

Table 2: Gender of Respondents

Gender	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Female	63	41.2%	41.2%
Male	90	58.8%	100.0%

The above given table reflects the distribution of gender of the respondents, dominated by males with 90 individuals constituting 58.8% of the total. Whereas, 63 female respondents constitute 41.2 percent of the total. However, males dominated in this survey result women contributed significantly.

Table 3: Level of Education of Respondents

Level of education	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Bachelor's	64	41.8%	41.8%
Postgraduate or More	60	39.2%	81.0%
Primary	1	0.7%	81.7%
Secondary	28	18.3%	100.0%

The above table provides insight into the highest level of education of respondents. The largest group of respondents 64 individuals hold a Bachelor's degree which makes up 41.8 % of the total. Similarly, 60 respondents almost 39.2% of the total hold postgraduate or higher education. The education level of 28 respondents is 28 whereas 1 respondent holds primary education. Thus, this sample is dominated by respondents with high education.

Table 4: Response of Respondents to the Profession

What is your profession?	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Business	29	19.0%	19.0%
Job	59	38.6%	57.5%
Other	28	18.3%	75.8%
Student	37	24.2%	100.0%

The above-given table summarises the profession of the respondents. 19.0 % of people are involved in business, 38.6 % are employed, and 18.3 % selected the option of others that include freelancing, traditional roles such as housewife etc. Whereas, 24.2% of people are students. The people who are doing jobs dominated this survey. This shows a representation of people with diverse professional backgrounds.

Table 5: Response to Support of Political Parties?

Do you support any Political Party in Pakistan?	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
No	50	32.7%	32.7%
Yes	103	67.3%	100.0%

In this table, respondents are expressing their affiliation with political parties. Of 50 respondents, 32.7 % indicated that they do not support any political party, which shows a lack of engagement with politics or dissatisfaction with political options. On the other hand, 103 respondents, 67.3 % indicated support for a political party. This shows strong engagement with the political environment

Table 6: Attended political rallies or protests in the last 5 years

Have you attended any political rallies or protests in the last 5 years?	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
No	85	55.6%	55.6%
Yes	68	44.4%	100.0%


In this table, 55.6% of respondents indicated that they have not attended any political rallies and protests in the last five years. On the other hand, 44.4% of respondents indicated that they have attended political rallies and protests. This shows that the majority of the respondents show a lack of participation in political mobilisation, though others are keenly involved in political mobilisation.

Table 7: *Residence of Respondents*

Residents	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Rural area	26	17.0%	17.0%
Urban area	127	83.0%	100.0%


The above table displays that respondents from urban areas dominated the survey with 127 individuals making 83.0% of the total sample. Whereas 25 respondents reside in rural areas making up 17.0% of the total population. Thus, the perspective of urban-dominated people is more pronounced.

Chart 1: *Perception of Respondents of Pakistan’s Democracy*



The above-given chart signifies that the x-axis represents two responses “Yes” and “No” and counts the respondents on the y-axis. According to this Bar Chart, 100 respondents believe that Pakistan does not follow democracy while 53 perceive otherwise. The line graph depicts the cumulative percentage of responses on the y-axis. Thus, the responses suggest that the majority of the respondents feel dissatisfaction towards the democratic system prevailing in the country.

Chart 2: *Type of Democracy in Pakistan*



The above given chart indicates the kinds of democracy practised in Pakistan. The largest number of respondents are not sure that what kind of democracy Pakistan follows, this make up to more than 100. Whereas, 70 respondents opined that Pakistan is illiberal or procedural democracy and 25 identified Pakistan as substantive democracy. The largest group that is of respondents who said “unsure” shows that there is a widespread clarity of the nature of political system in Pakistan. Almost 45 % people believe that Pakistan only relies on electoral side of the democracy but lack the implementation of essence of democracy. While 10% of the perceive that Pakistan follows a substantive form of democracy which propagates political liberties, rule of law and citizen participation.

Table 8: *Voting Parties of Respondents*

Which political party you voted in the last General Elections (2024) in Pakistan?	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
None	25	16.3%	16.3%
Other	11	7.2%	23.5%
Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N)	19	12.4%	35.9%
Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	6	3.9%	39.9%
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf	92	60.1%	100.0%

The table illustrate the distribution of respondents voted in the General Elections in Pakistan (2024). 25 respondents which is almost 16.3 % of the total opted for not voting any major political party in Pakistan proves a political disengagement. While 7.2 % that is 25 respondents given votes to other parties not the listed major political

ones. 12.4 % of the total with 19 respondents voted Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and 3.9 % of the total with only 6 respondents voted Pakistan People's Party (PPP) shows the distrust of respondents on these parties. The majority party is Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf with 60.1% of the total comprising 92 respondents, this party dominated the political scene. This shows the political preferences of the respondents in the General Elections of Pakistan (2024).

Table 9: *Perception of Respondents about General Elections 2024*

How do you perceive the last General Election of Pakistan (2024)?	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Fair	12	7.8%	7.8%
Not sure	24	15.7%	23.5%
Rigged	117	76.5%	100.0%

In the above table only 7.8 % of the total which is 12 respondents believe that the General Elections of Pakistan (2024) were fair, this shows low level of confidence regarding fairness in electoral process. Whereas 24 respondents, 15.7 % of the total sample are uncertain regarding the fairness. However, 117 respondents, 76.5 % of the total sample perceive these elections as rigged and unfair. This shows that the electoral integrity is in severe distrust. This shows that there is a dissatisfaction with the procedural democracy in Pakistan.

Table 10: *Binomial Test (Performance of Old Political Parties)*

	Level	Count	Total	Proportion	P
Do you think old political parties (PPP, PML-N) performed well in their tenures?	Agree	19	153	0.124	<.001
	Disagree	26	153	0.170	<.001
	Neutral	25	153	0.163	<.001
	Strongly Agree	2	153	0.013	<.001
	Strongly Disagree	81	153	0.529	0.518
What is the level of your overall satisfaction with the performance of old political parties (PPP, PML-N)?	Neutral	27	153	0.176	<.001
	Somewhat Dissatisfied	20	153	0.131	<.001
	Somewhat Satisfied	24	153	0.157	<.001
	Very Dissatisfied	82	153	0.536	0.419

Note. H_a is proportion $\neq 0.5$

According to the above given binomial test table 19 respondents, 12.4 % of the total agree that the old political parties performed well in their tenures. Indicating that few respondents view the performance of the old parties in positive manner. 26

respondents, 17 % of the total disagree with the statement indicated that respondents are dissatisfied with the performance of old political parties. 25 respondents, 16.3 % of the total sample adopted a neutral stance indicated that respondents remain indifferent. Only 2 respondents, 1.3 % of the total strongly agree to the statement that these parties performed well, indicated a minimal support. The majority of respondents comprised 81 people with 52% of the total strongly disagree with the statement. Regarding the overall satisfaction with the old political parties 17.6 % respondents remained neutral, and 13.1% shows somewhat dissatisfaction, this shows reservations over performance but not a complete dissatisfaction. 15.7 % respondents replied that they are somewhat satisfied though this group is small in number. The majority of the respondents 53.6 % of total sample, 82 respondents shown strong dissatisfaction towards the old political parties. This shows that old political parties PPP and PML-N failed to meet the expectations of the people. Thus, the overwhelming proportions illustrate that there is a high level of dissatisfaction towards the performance of the old political parties. The response categories statistically indicated that the perception of the respondents is not merely random but pertinent.

Table 11: *Proportion Test (N Outcomes)- What is the major reason for your dissatisfaction with the old political parties?*

Level	Count	Proportion
All	81	0.529
Corruption	37	0.242
Economic Failures	16	0.105
Poor Governance	19	0.124

The above table depicts the results of a proportion test using a Chi-Square (χ^2) Goodness of Fit Test to determine the reasons for the dissatisfaction with the old political parties. 81 respondents, 52.9% of the total expressed dissatisfaction overall dissatisfaction. Although 24.2% of the total opined that corruption is the major reason behind their dissatisfaction, 10.5 % cited that the dissatisfaction emerges from the economic failures of the parties. Only 12.4 % identified that poor governance is the main reason for dissatisfaction. This highlighted that people are dissatisfied because these parties are involved in corrupt practices, cannot manage the economy, and exercise poor governance. Concerning the Chi-square test the value is 70.5 higher which suggests that the reasons for dissatisfaction are not evenly distributed. Thus, there is not a single major reason for dissatisfaction but many.

Table 12: Binomial Test (Power Politics and Leadership of Old Political Parties)

	Level	Count	Total	Proportion	P
Do you think old political parties are only involved in Power Politics rather than resolving genuine concerns of people of Pakistan?	Agree	53	153	0.346	<.001
	Disagree	3	153	0.020	<.001
	Neutral	14	153	0.092	<.001
	Strongly Agree	80	153	0.523	0.628
	Strongly Disagree	3	153	0.020	<.001
What you perceive about the leadership of old political parties?	Disconnected from people	22	153	0.144	<.001
	Experienced but ineffective	23	153	0.150	<.001
	Involved in corruption and malpractices	92	153	0.601	0.015
	Other	16	153	0.105	<.001

Note. H_a is proportion $\neq 0.5$

In this table, 34.6% of respondents agree with the question that old political parties are involved in power politics rather than addressing genuine concerns of the people, whereas 52.3% of the respondents strongly agree. Interestingly, only 2% of the respondents indicated they disagree and 2% expressed strongly disagree respectively. 9.2% of people remained neutral. Regarding the perception of old political parties 60% of the respondents indicated that parties are involved in corruption and malpractices, proving the negative attitude of people towards old leadership. 14.4% of the respondents perceive that the leadership of old political parties is basically disconnected from the masses, 15% indicated that old leadership is experienced but ineffective and only 10.5 % responded with other.

Table 13: Binomial Test (Involvement of Non-Political Actors)

	Level	Count	Total	Proportion	P
Do you think that Pakistan is an unstable democracy because of the involvement of non-political actors?	Agree	59	153	0.386	0.006
	Disagree	3	153	0.020	<.001
	Neutral	17	153	0.111	<.001
	Strongly Agree	70	153	0.458	0.332
	Strongly Disagree	4	153	0.026	<.001
Do you support the intervention of non-political actors in Pakistan's political landscape?	Maybe	37	153	0.242	<.001
	No	91	153	0.595	0.023
	Yes	25	153	0.163	<.001

Note. H_a is proportion $\neq 0.5$

The above table represents the opinion on the intervention of non-political actors in the political landscape of Pakistan. 59 respondents, 38.6 % of the total agree that Pakistan is democratically unstable due to the involvement of the non-political actors. Whereas 2.0% of the total, only 3 respondents indicate that non-political actors are not the cause of unstable Pakistan and 11.1 % are neutral, neither agreeing nor disagreeing. The majority of the respondents 45.8 % of the total sample strongly agree that Pakistan is unstable due to non-political actors and 2.6 % strongly disagree on the question posed.

Table 14: Proportion Test (N Outcomes) Do you think the dissatisfaction with the old political parties and non-political actors will continue to grow in the future

Level	Count	Proportion
Maybe	32	0.209
No	20	0.131
Yes	101	0.660

The table reflects the perception of people that dissatisfaction persists or not with the old political parties and non-political actors in future. 20.9 % of the total sample, 32 respondents indicate the dissatisfaction may not continue to grow in future, this shows their satisfaction with the political dynamics. Similarly, 20 respondents, 13.1 % of the total sample clearly expressed that they do not see dissatisfaction in future. The majority of the respondents 101, 66.0% of the total indicated that dissatisfaction will continue to grow in future, this shows the opinion of the majority.

Table 15: Perception of Respondents about Populism

How do you perceive populism?	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
A mixture of both mentioned above	61	39.9%	40.6%
A movement to address the grievances of people	36	23.5%	63.4%
A political strategy to manipulate people's opinion	31	20.3%	83.7%
A temporary trend	25	16.3%	100.0%

The above table describes the perception of respondents on populism. 61 respondents, 39.9% perceive populism as a mixture of two variables: addressing people's grievances and a political strategy to manipulate public opinion. Whereas, 23.5 % of people perceive populism as the movement to address the grievances of people, emphasising the potential for a positive political change. 20.3% of people consider populism a political strategy to manipulate public opinion and 16.3 % of people suggest that populism is a temporary trend. Thus, a larger proportion of groups take populism as a mixture.

Table 16: Binomial Test (Perception of Respondents regarding Populism)

	Level	Count	Total	Proportion	p
Do you think Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf is a populist party?	Agree	44	153	0.288	<.001
	Disagree	15	153	0.098	<.001
	Neutral	33	153	0.216	<.001
	Strongly Agree	55	153	0.359	<.001
	Strongly Disagree	6	153	0.039	<.001
Do you believe that Imran Khan is a populist leader?	Agree	45	153	0.294	<.001
	Disagree	13	153	0.085	<.001
	Neutral	25	153	0.163	<.001
	Strongly Agree	63	153	0.412	0.035
	Strongly Disagree	7	153	0.046	<.001

Note. H_a is proportion $\neq 0.5$

This table talks about the populist variable, 35.9 % of the total respondents strongly agree that PTI is a populist party whereas 41.2 % of the total strongly agree that Imran Khan is a populist leader. Similarly, 28.8 % of respondents agree that PTI is a populist party and 29.4 % agree that Imran Khan is a populist leader. 21.6% of people remained neutral about PTI and 16.3 % about Imran Khan. The number of people who disagree with both questions is 9.8% and 8.5% respectively. Whereas, in the strongly disagree category 3.9% indicated PTI as not a populist party and 4.6% expressed Imran Khan as not a populist leader. The majority of the respondents in terms of strongly agree and agree that PTI and Imran Khan are populists.

Table 17: Proportions Test (N Outcomes) Do you believe that Imran Khan better represents the will of the people?

Level	Count	Proportion
Agree	59	0.3856
Disagree	21	0.1373
Neutral	17	0.1111
Strongly Agree	48	0.3137
Strongly Disagree	8	0.0523

χ^2 Goodness of Fit

df	p
4	<.001

In this χ^2 Goodness of Fit test, 38.56% of people agree that Imran Khan represents the will of the people and 31.37% indicated strong agreement over the statement. Only 13.73 % showed disagreement and 5.23% suggested strong disagreement over the statement. Whereas, 11.11% took a neutral stance. Thus, the majority of the respondents perceive that Imran Khan represents the will of the people of Pakistan.

Table 18: *Binomial Test (Perception of Respondents about Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf)*

	Level	Count	Total	Proportion	p
Do you think PTI affected how people think about the policies of old political parties?	Agree	72	153	0.471	0.518
	Disagree	5	153	0.033	<.001
	Neutral	19	153	0.124	<.001
	Strongly Agree	51	153	0.333	<.001
	Strongly Disagree	6	153	0.04	<.001
Do you think that PTI performed well in its government tenure?	Agree	55	153	0.359	<.001
	Disagree	30	153	0.196	<.001
	Neutral	28	153	0.183	<.001
	Strongly Agree	23	153	0.150	<.001
	Strongly Disagree	17	153	0.111	<.001

Note. H_a is proportion $\neq 0.5$

In the above binomial test, 47.1% of respondents agree that PTI with its narrative affected people regarding the policies of the old political parties and 33.3% strongly agree with the preceding statement. 12.4% of people remained neutral on the statement whereas only 3.3% disagreed and 4% showed strong disagreement. This suggests that PTI played a significant role in shaping public opinion. On the question of the performance of the PTI in its tenure, 35.9% agree and 15% of the people strongly agree that PTI performed well in its tenure. 18.3 % of people indicated neutrality, 20% indicated disagreement and 11.1% strong disagreement over the performance of PTI. The majority of the respondents rated the performance of PTI well in its government tenure.

Table 19: *Perception of Respondents on people's dissatisfaction with old Political Parties*

Which factor influences people's dissatisfaction with the old political parties: policy failure or populism?	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Both	70	45.8%	45.8%
Not sure	15	9.8%	55.6%
Policy Failure	56	36.6%	92.2%
Populism	12	7.8%	100.0%

In the above table, it is ascertained which variable influences dissatisfaction towards old political parties. 45.8% of the respondents perceived that policy failures and populism both are the factors behind the dissatisfaction with the old political parties. 9.8% of the people indicated that they were unsure. 36.6% attributed policy failure as the factor of dissatisfaction and 7.8% stated populism. The majority of the people perceived that policy failures and populism both contributed towards dissatisfaction, it also surfaced that people are more interested in alternative parties than the old ones. A significant proportion of opinion held policy failures responsible for dissatisfaction which shows that old political parties pursued flawed policies.

Table 20: Binomial Test (Influence of Media)

	Level	Count	Total	Proportion	p
How has traditional media coverage influenced your perceptions about old political parties?	Do not follow traditional media	69	153	0.451	0.258
	Negatively	29	153	0.190	<.001
	Neutral	35	153	0.229	<.001
	Positively	20	153	0.131	<.001
How has social media influenced your perception of a populist party?	Do not follow social media	19	153	0.124	<.001
	Negatively	33	153	0.216	<.001
	Neutral	37	153	0.242	<.001
	Positively	64	153	0.418	0.052

Note. H_a is proportion $\neq 0.5$

The table evaluated traditional media and social media in shaping opinions. 45.1 % of people reported that they do not follow traditional media so they are not influenced by it regarding perceptions of old political parties. 19% of the respondents think that traditional media negatively influenced the perception of old political parties, 22.9% remained neutral and 13.1 % indicated that traditional media positively influenced the perception of old political parties. The majority of the respondents do not follow traditional media. The perception of people is diverse in this regard. Regarding social media, 12.4% of people do not follow social media. 21.6% stated that social media has negatively influenced perceptions about old political parties, 24.2% people remained neutral and 41.8% suggested positive attributes that social media played a significant role in shaping populist opinion. This also shows that the majority of people rely on social media than traditional media.

Table 21: *Proportions Test (N Outcomes) Do you think populism in Pakistan reflects the real concerns of the people or is it a mere rhetoric?*

Level	Count	Proportion
Mere Rhetoric	33	0.216
Mixture of both	51	0.333
Not sure	29	0.190
Real Concerns	40	0.261

 χ^2 Goodness of Fit

χ^2	df	P
7.29	3	0.063

Table 22: *Binomial Test (Populist Leader and Dissatisfaction with old Political Parties)*

	Level	Count	Total	Proportion	p
How likely are you to support a populist leader over an experienced politician from an old party?	Likely	46	153	0.301	<.001
	Neutral	46	153	0.301	<.001
	Unlikely	11	153	0.072	<.001
	Very Likely	36	153	0.235	<.001
	Very Unlikely	14	153	0.092	<.001
Do you think that the dissatisfaction with old political parties will lead to long-term political change in Pakistan?	Agree	56	153	0.366	0.001
	Disagree	18	153	0.118	<.001
	Neutral	32	153	0.209	<.001
	Strongly Agree	41	153	0.268	<.001
	Strongly Disagree	6	153	0.039	<.001

Note. H_a is proportion $\neq 0.5$

This binomial table suggests that 30.1% of the people will likely support a populist leader over an experienced one and 23.5% of the total indicated this is very likely. 30.1% remained neutral, only 7.2% indicated unlikely and 9.2% indicated very unlikely. This shows that people support populism and populist leaders over the leaders of old political parties. Regarding the question that dissatisfaction with old

political parties leads towards long-term political change 36.6% of respondents indicated agree and 26.8% strongly agree. 20.9% of people remained neutral, 11.8% stated disagree and only 3.9% indicated strongly disagree. This means that the majority of the respondents are optimistic that dissatisfaction with old political parties will lead towards a long-lasting political change.

Discussion and Conclusion

The aim of the research paper was to test the hypothesis in this research paper regarding the dissatisfaction of the people of Pakistan with regards to procedural democracy or the rise of populism. The research concludes that the dissatisfaction of the general masses of Pakistan emanates from the procedural democracy in which they have shown distrust towards the policies of the traditional old political parties and the intervention of the military. The hypothesis 1: dissatisfaction towards old political parties and non-political actors is influenced by the failure of policies is stronger ($p < 0.01$, $R^2 = 0.45$). The results indicated statistically important impact with a p-value of less than 0.01 ($p < 0.01$). This is a strong indicator that policy failures of old political parties and intervention of military is cause of dissatisfaction. However, the people of Pakistan see a populist political party and leader as an alternative to the old faces and old policies. Most of the general masses perceive that Imran Khan is a popular leader who is semblance of hope and optimism. Though this is not entirely a fact that dissatisfaction from procedural democracy is the outcome of populism. The hypothesis 2: dissatisfaction towards old political parties and non-political actors is influenced only by populism is less strong ($p = 0.08$, $R^2 = 0.25$). The result indicates p-value of ($p < 0.05$) which means it is statistically less than hypothesis 1. Thus, the dissatisfaction against the procedural democracy in lieu with old political parties and military will keep on rise in the future. This rise lead towards a sustainable and long-term political change because the masses have rejected the old political players.

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