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India's Nuclear Journey: A Road to Sagan's Nuclear Security Model

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Abstract

Security rather than norms has been witnessed as the key motivation behind the acquisition of nuclear capability. With the evolution of lethal weapons, the question of nuclear security raises among the policy makers of states throughout world. In the aftermath of World War two, the growing concerns of security has convinced the states to achieve nuclear capabilities in order to sustain their survival. The thrust of India Nuclear Capability strictly follows the lines of security. The humiliating defeat of India in Sino-Indian War 1962, followed by Chinese Nuclear Tests 1964, Policy Makers could only see their survival in nuclearization of India. Later on, enmity with Pakistan hit the nail in the head of Indian security. The research is conducted to clarify the basic motivation behind the Indian nuclear tests. Nuclear Security Model of Sagan is applied in order to investigate the facts behind the concerns of Indian Policy Makers. As China took a nuclear route to counter the might of United States of America while India followed the identical lines to counter Chinese Nuclear Capability. The researchers have used the qualitative method to pursue the study.

Key Words: India, China, Nuclear Journey, Security, Defence

Introduction

National interest accompanied by security concerns are the two unshakeable truths that have dominated states' decisions, regarding the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. In the world of International Relations, no state could ever rely on solely political ethics or merely diplomatic means, in order to protect her boundaries. The foreign policy of a state has always been overwhelmed by security concerns. Total security has proved to be a daydream for even the most powerful states of the world. After the evolution of Nuclear Technology, the concept of nuclear destruction has

emerged as a most destructive deterrent among the power mongering states. This has resulted in new faces of warfare among the actors of International Relations. (Sagan, 1996) The concept of having maximum security became major dilemma for the defense policy of states. Sagan's nuclear security model kept track of states' behavior while running after achieving maximum security to prevent its peak security threats. Indian nuclear journey went parallel to the security concerns and challenges vis-à-vis national interest. At the time of independence, security policy of India was quite different. Nehru, during his regime, pressed towards peaceful resolution of conflicts and neglected the security barrier of military power (Noorani, 1967). He traded security power towards diplomatic means for the resolution of territorial conflicts. In the first half of the 1960s, India had to engage with two border enemies and fought two full scale wars, the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1965 India-Pakistan War.

The humiliating defeat of the 1962 war with China, left several vivid scars on the integrity of India. Later on, India made a drastic change in her foreign policy from the supporter of non-nuclear proliferation to manufacturing her nuclear weapons (Noorani, 1967). In the last five decades, India had experienced a roller coaster journey to achieve its nuclear bomb. The first four decades of Indian foreign policy were over layered by reactive and flexible stance. However, the moral politics was overstepped by hardcore strategic shift followed by the successful nuclear explosion in 1974.

In the post Indira regime 1980s, the formulation of Indian Security Policy shifted towards United Front Government. Subsequently, BJP succeeded to form government in mid 1990s. The major component to acquire the nuclear weapons and went for having maximum security for defense was emerging threat from China as well as from the Pakistan and her alliance with major powers (Seshia, 1998). In 1998, India completed her nuclear journey with the code name 'Operation Shakti'. India conducted a series of nuclear tests at the place of Pokhran and made a significant improvement towards her nuclear capabilities. This action brought instability and deterioration in the balance of power among the two rivals of South Asia. The government of India gave the justification in the context of nuclear programs of China as well as Pakistan. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then Prime Minister, said that the possession of nuclear deterrence was necessary to make sure her national security and threaten her potential adversaries. As contrasted, Pakistan tested her nuclear devices in response to Indian nuclear experiments in 1998. As quoted by Sagan, "The state decision to have nuclear weapons was habitually driven by security, political, and strategic considerations. A credible possession of nuclear warlords could have the potential to counter threats from enemy states (Sagan, 1996),

Theoretical Framework

In 1969, Scott Douglas Sagan presented his Nuclear Security model, the model explained the answer to a question why do states build nuclear arsenals? The certain model depicted the neorealist school of thought in International Relations. According to this model, states existed in an environment of anarchy in the international system. In the specific political system, states had to rely on self-help and protect their national security by all means. The sovereign states had to build nuclear weapons against war threats more specifically nuclear threats and had to

work on the enhancement of weapons. The nuclear security model suggested that the states acquired weapons when their security environment was under the enormous destructive threat of the nuclear warheads and they felt that they could not get their security unless they built their nuclear weapons aimed to balance the power against the rival states. The security model of Sagan believed in the idea of 'Proliferation begets proliferation (Sagan, 1996). The model elaborated that nuclear proliferation as a chain reaction. Such as nuclear history explained as the United States gained nuclear weapons fearing the Germans would get them during World War 2. Stalin and the Soviet Union gained nuclear weapons because the United States, Britain, and France gained nuclear weapons because of the Soviet Union. China acquired the nuclear after threats, the United States issued after the Cold War or at the end of the Korean War, felt threatened by the United States' nuclear weapons and the Russians backed away from their agreements to help the Chinese, so they built their nuclear weapons. Kim Jong Il was seen as a leader in acquiring nuclear weapons because of the threat from the United States (Sagan, 1994).

The researchers employed Sagan's nuclear security model to explain, India acquired her nuclear weapons because of the fear of China's nuclear weapons. Later on Pakistan's nuclear program, also pushed India to acquire more capability in the nuclear weapons technology. The nuclear security model produced two policies about nuclear power for a state. The first policy, for a developed and self-sufficient economic state, this type of state had the power to do what it wanted to do and could make its own nukes. The second policy was for a weaker state. In this situation, a weaker state did, what it must had to do. In a threatening situation, a developing state could join a balancing alliance in search of a nuclear umbrella (Sagan, 1996). For such a state, the nuclear alliance was the only option to protect its national security. However, this policy failed to give a satisfactory answer to the upcoming extended deterrence from its rival state. Eventually, the state had to indulge itself in a war.

While taking the case study of India', a researcher can apply both policies on it. After the Chinese nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964, India went to the United States and the United Kingdom to ask for a nuclear umbrella guarantee (Kennedy, 2011). India put a question ahead, whether India would facilitate with nuclear umbrella in dealing with communist China's nuclear aggression or not? However, India had to face disappointment from its allies. After the big disappointment, in the contradictory of this policy, Indian political leaders decided to develop its own nuclear weapon to counter China's nuclear threat. On May 13, 1998, India's nuclear explosions were the result of security policy.

Awareness of Nuclear Technology

In the journey of India's nuclear bomb, the very initial step was to build the Atomic Energy Research Committee by Homi Bhabha. He was a nuclear physicist and known as the founding father of Indian Nuclear Program. Homi Bhabha, a physicist at the Institute of Science in India, initially recognized the importance of atomic energy at the international level. He took some necessary primary steps to fertile the concept of civil nuclear technology in India. In 1944, he took the proposal to Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and asked for the first nuclear research center in India (Penny, 1967). In late 1944, his request was granted and Tata Trust agreed to take all the

financial responsibility of the first nuclear research laboratory of British India. The year 1945 was marked with the establishment of institute named "TATA Institute of Fundamental Research".

Nuclear Policy of Independent India 1947

Following the Independence of India from British Raj 1947, the newly free state stepped in towards nuclear age, which emerged in 1945 with the dropping of the atomic bomb by United States of America on two coastal cities of Japan, Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. At that particular time, India was well aware of the dual use of nuclear technology. India had two options for nuclear technology, a destructive aspect and a productive aspect (Sebnem, 2017).

The first use of nuclear technology was destructive. In which a state could make a nuclear weapon by using the technology of nuclear and that could transfer into the weapons of mass destruction. Through this process, a state could exploit the destructive aspect of nuclear weapons. The second use of the nuclear technology was in the developed sphere. Any state could enhance the speed of development by using this aspect of technology. As the civil use of nuclear energy could produce a massive amount of electricity (Sebnem, 2017).

Road to Nuclear Plantation

After the independence of India in 1947, Bhabha realized the deficiency of certain facilities for the Nuclear Research Institute. He decided to write a letter to Jawahar Lal Nehru and asked for the provision of a new laboratory (Penny, 1967). In 1948, Bhabha succeeded in convincing the Indian government for the need of new research institute. The name of a new research laboratory was "Atomic Energy Research Committee".

The essential aims of the Institution were:

1. The promotion of Nuclear Research in India
2. Enable the scientists with training facilities
3. The expansion of nuclear science at utmost levels
4. The flourishment in the Research of Natural Resources on Indian Soil (Penny, 1967)

In 1948, India established the Atomic Energy Commission. Homi J. Bhabha was the chairman of this Commission. In 1954, India created the Department of Atomic Energy. This department worked directly under the control of Prime Minister Nehru. By 1956, with the help of the United Kingdom and France, India was capable of building Asia's first nuclear research reactor named APSARA. By 1960, India collaborated with Canada and the USA to successfully establish its second nuclear reactor, named CIRUS (Canada India Reactor Utility Services). (Sethi, 2014) Bhabha also appreciated the concept of "psychological-political impact" and believed that India should be prepared to counter the adversary potential of nuclear weapons. (Penny, 1967) He thought that the answer to nuclear weapons should be in the shape of nuclear weapons. This was the only way to maintain the balance of power between two rival states.

Sino-Indian War: Quest to Indian Security

In the early years of independence, Indian foreign policy pushed India for a special cooperative relationship with China. At this particular time, Pakistan was holding the position of the only enemy of India at her neighborhood. Pakistan was a weak state and knew well that for the sake of national security purposes, she had to find stronger allies. In order to achieve the purpose of security, Pakistan came into strategic alliance with West. Indian Prime Minister Nehru wanted to take a neutral stance between the two groups. But Pakistan's alliance with the United States made Pakistan stronger and it was an open threat to the national security of India. Nehru assessed the national security threats and secured India's survival by making friendship with China. The emerging security threats for India acknowledged that the formation of alliance with China was morally right and a pragmatic approach to cooperating in the region of Asia. (Hall, 2016) The friendship with China was fashioned with the slogan "*Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai*." This enchanted slogan became a cornerstone of Nehruvianism policy.

In 1954, Nehru gave his remarks on the Pakistan-United States alliance: "The United States imagined that by adopting the policy of making Pakistan friend, the alliance would completely outflank India's neutralism and determination. By this means, they would bring India to her knees. Whatever the future might holds India, this would not be going to happen (Noorani, 1967). The nuclear security model encouraged the states' aggressive behavior in a situation of compensating for conventional weakness. The states with limited military resources might grab the concept that nuclear devices could be beneficial to compensate for conventional military weaknesses. The states had a view of a cost-effective nuclear technology to fill the national security deterrence gap.

However, by the start of the 1960s, Indian security environment deteriorated gradually due to the emerging border conflict with China. India's foreign policy was shifting into her new phase because of new-fangled security concerns and issues on the two sides of borders. On November 16, 1962, a full-scale war broke out between China and India. During this war, India had to face a humiliating defeat (Kerttunen, 2009). This war became the cause of a long-term major shift in Indian policies.

The foreign policy of India tilted towards realpolitik. The very first sign of this change could be seen during the war itself, Nehru had to turn his face to the United States and United Kingdom for military aid (Noorani, 1967). But his request was turned down, which made India to think about its self-sufficiency in its security matters. The Indo-China War of 1962 played a pivotal role in prompting a significant shift in India's approach towards the utilization of nuclear technology. Right after the Sino-India war, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, (today's BJP) political party came forward and demanded nuclear weapons for security purposes (Cherian, 1998).

India's rising interest in nuclear weapons, after China's emerging hegemony in the region, could be justified by the idea of balance of power in Sagan's model, he says: "In international relations, the dynamic of balance of power between two rival states hold a key position in the journey of having nuclear power. When a rival neighboring state acquired nuclear weapons or going to possess nuclear capability, it became necessary for the other state to counter its emerging status as a single dominant actor in the region (Sagan, 1994).

Rise of Nuclear China

On October 16, 1964, through an official statement, the Chinese government declared herself a nuclear power country. China claimed that the purpose of her first nuclear explosion was defense and opposition to the United States' imperialist policy of nuclear threat and blackmail. In addition, the Chinese government defined the motives by saying that "Self-defense was an absolute right of any sovereign state. To look after the peace of world, was a collective task for every peace-loving state. But in the adversary situation, China could not turn its face from an increasing threat every day by the United States. Under this compulsion, China needed to conduct her first nuclear tests and enhancement." (Wilson Centre Digital Archives, 1967) Furthermore, China proclaimed that in the past she had been advocating for the comprehensive prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. If this ideal goal had been achieved, there was no need for China to develop her nuclear weapons. However, the stubborn attitude of the United States and its imperialist mindset compelled China to go against the idea of a nuclear weaponless world.

On the contrary, China's nuclear explosion gave a major setback to the national security concerns of India. Although China had announced that the United States was the major component behind its nuclear explosion and made sure it's second strike policy related to nuclear attacks India was not satisfied and felt sandwiched pressed by two neighborhoods, China and Pakistan.

India officially conveyed her reaction from the Indian Embassy stationed in China. The Indian government was concerned about the success of China's nuclear detonation. It blew the mind and gave major shocks to the entire nation of India. The explosions dragged India's foreign policy towards the anti-China security policy. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India, tried to get other countries of Asia and Africa on board against China to condemn its nuclear explosions but failed. He also organized a gathering in Dehli with the name of "Anti Atomic Bomb Explosion Day" to oppose China (Wilson Centre Digital Archives, 1967).

In the environment of desolation, the public opinion was split into two opinions, whether India should go for self-nuclear weapons or not. Although, Shastri highly condemned the Chinese nuclear explosions but his government along with several other officials of the Indian National Congress were still reluctant to go for atomic bomb policy. Besides the right-wing opinions, the opposition and left-wing political individuals were openly vocal against the government and advocated in favor of nuclear bombs.

Those people who supported the idea of manufacturing nuclear bombs mentioned several reasons: first, India could secure its borders and resist against the emerging power of China in the region. Second, by the adoption of nuclear weapons, India would be able to regain its declining status and reputation in Asia and Africa. Third, India could gain its own military strength and get independence from the external military aid from the United States. Fourth, scientists were also in favor of manufacturing nuclear bombs. (Cherian, 1998) They were optimistic and believed that nuclear technology would benefit India's technological advancement.

Search for Nuclear Umbrella

According to the Sagan Nuclear Security Theory, developing states could have experienced the economic crisis and lacked in the capability to produce their own nuclear weapons. This drastic situation made weaker states to consider seeking assistance from other states to strengthen their national security. At the particular time, India was facing the same economic issues. The group who condemned the idea of having an atomic bomb shared several concerns. First, India was facing a drastic decline in economic growth and couldn't meet the expenses of manufacturing atomic bombs. The defense budget was already limited and couldn't be stretched to counter China. In this case, India would face unbearable damage to its economy. Second, if China escalates war to nuclear war, it could lead to a next World War. India, which had alliances with both the United States and the Soviet Union, found itself in a position where it needed to seek a nuclear umbrella from its friendly nations (Kennedy, 2011). Third, the geographical position and decline in the economy wouldn't allow India to get involved in a massive and disadvantageous war with the advanced nuclear weapons of China. To have only nuclear weapons couldn't solve India's every problem. In a nutshell, the security problems were escalated for India. Keeping in mind the economic conditions, India decided to go in search of a nuclear umbrella.

The Asian region was considered a free nuclear zone, but after 1964, China initiated a nuclear weapon race in this region. This particular event made a major change in India's foreign policy. India was very concerned about the border security. Initially, India decided to approach the United States and the USSR to ask for a nuclear guarantee. This means if China ever decided to attack India then on India's behalf the provider of the nuclear guarantee state would attack on China. But both countries, the United States and USSR turned down India's request (Noorani, 1967). At the moment, India decided not to rely on the alliance of the United States only because to control of India and friendship with Pakistan was in the major interest of the United States at that time. India could see that the manufacturing of atomic bombs was destined to counter China and enhance its influence at the international level.

Indo-Pak War 1965 and a Major Shift in Foreign Policy

In 1965, India had to face another war with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. The significant event of War-1965 brought a radical change in the foreign policy of India. The Indian government knew that her security issues were getting worse gradually. India had to face two total wars on two different fronts in a decade. Before the war, India was following the policy of non-alignment in the era of the Cold War. (Mallik, 1967). After the war, India decided to abandon the non-alignment and looked for strong strategic partners aimed at national security concerns. The conflict on two fronts dragged India to look for nuclear deterrence to counter its enemies China and Pakistan. At the moment, India felt the need for a 'necessary evil' and that was nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty & Indian Stance

In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was announced, with the participation of the five nuclear-armed nations: the USA, USSR, France, Britain,

and China. This treaty aimed to curtail the proliferation of nuclear technology. India called the NPT treaty as a discriminatory and openly opposed it aimed of security concerns for the non-nuclear states (Weiss, 2013). India decided not to join this treaty and said that by joining this treaty India would shut the doors of nuclear weapon options permanently. Furthermore, this treaty was giving [not] any guarantee to eliminate nuclear weapons on the earth.

War with Pakistan 1971 | A Road to Confirmation

Indian intervention in East Pakistan hyped the conflict between Mukti-Bani rebels and government of Pakistan. The non-stop pressure on Eastern Pakistan front convinced Pakistan to launch Operation Chengiz Khan. Pakistan Air Force launched air strikes on several Indian airfields including, Amritsar, Jhodpur, Pathankot, Srinagar, Ambala and Agra. (McLeod, 2016). After the short and intense war of thirteen days, India defeated Pakistan. The Country was split into two parts. A new independent state with the name of Bangladesh emerged.

The Sagan's security model described the behavior of states, aiming to highlight the national security problems pin in order to achieve maximum nukes. However, Indian pledged the false propaganda regarding the East Pakistan crisis, they wanted to justify their nuclear ambitions and the acquired nuclear weapons soon. Indira Gandhi appeared in a press conference after war 1971 and expressed that the certain war had arisen the security concerns of India in the future. In addition, she justified the Indian invasion in East Pakistan by saying that the UN and other foreign powers were failed to resolve this matter between India and Pakistan. She claimed that "more than ten million refugees were overflowed in India from East Pakistan. They spread a certain amount of disease in India. So, it had to face tremendous economic difficulties to feed and shelter refugees. And then, they created lots of administrative, political, and social problems. Most hazardous to all, a danger to India's security" (The New York times, 1971).

Nuclear India | The Sagan's Solution

The security concerns and dilemmas of deterrence influenced the nature of foreign policy of any state. The Sagan nuclear security model ensured that the primary motivation for manufacturing nuclear weapons was the enhancement of state security. The state's nuclear weapons assured a catastrophic destructive force against its rival states to prevent any possible threats. Nuclear power was considered an important defensive and hegemonic tool in an international anarchy system. In the case of India, although India knocked down Pakistan in the war of 1971, India became more concerned about its primarily national security matters. She knew that Pakistan would never stay quiet after facing defeat and would take measures to regain its regional esteem.

The Sagan's model described the condition of uncertainly among states when a survival like situation ascended. Aiming to prevail, every state jumped on the stoke piles of military capabilities, strategies, adopting strong choices and a sound balance alignment for its state. After the defeat of the 1971 war with India, Pakistan allied with China and America to make the power balance with India and secured its borders. (McLeod, 2016). In addition, Pakistan became a bridge between two powers, the United States and China to bring them close. China got permanent membership in the United Nations with the help of America. This trio-state alliance

made India anxious about its regional hegemony. India decided to give a message to Pakistan and other South Asia states that India was more capable of securing borders. At that point, India was more confident about the nuclear power decision.

In September 1972, Indira Gandhi gave her consent to the scientists of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre to work on the manufacturing of nuclear power device operation. A minor squad of seventy-five scientists and engineers belonging to the Bhaba Atomic Research Center (BARC) were hired to develop and design a nuclear bomb for India. Indira Gandhi appointed Raja Ramanna as the head of this squad. (Abraham, 1998) The nuclear design project was done behind closed doors by these scientists. There were only three people who knew about this secret project in the government officials, P. N. Haksar, the adviser of the Prime Minister, D.P. Dhar, the Principal Secretary, and the third was Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi herself.

Indira Gandhi knew that India needed nuclear weapons to ensure the counter-deterrence of the trio-alliance of the United States-Pakistan and China. According to Sagan's Nuclear Security Model, states got involved in proliferation because of their security concerns and survival. They justify their participation by the explanation that nuclear warlords could only be effective aimed in balancing power and avoiding war ahead. Nuclear India was the only answer to the security question of state survival (Sagan, 1994).

Operation Smiling Buddha | Rise to Nuclear Region

In 1974, Indian nuclear journey reached its climax. On May 18, 1974, Indira gave a green signal to the nuclear tests by a call saying "Buddha Smile". By taking the command from the then Prime Minister, India successfully detonated its first nuclear tests in the Rajasthan desert at Pokhran. The secret operation was given the name "Smiling Buddha". The research reactor, CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor U.S.), was the major device to extract plutonium for nuclear tests. In 1960, Canada was the supplier of a 40-megawatt reactor to India. The nuclear device design was alike the implosion design of the 'Fat Man' atomic bomb but less modest. The range of the nuclear fission device was measured from 8 to 12 kilotons on average. (Perkovich, 1999). The explosion brought a worldwide shock and in return lots of sanctions for India. But India was more determined to its stance that the only purpose of this sanction was "peaceful" and economic prosperity of the state. The operation was far beyond any breakage of the non-proliferation treaty.

On the contrary, Indira Gandhi's later interviews sounded like she was more concerned about making a nuclear threshold rather than giving a peaceful gesture. On June 15, 1974, Indira Gandhi gave an interview and said that "India would agree to abandon the nuclear bomb if the other countries agreed to it" (The New York times, 1974). She added: "India thought that it was unjustifiable and discriminatory to push the prohibition of nuclear technology only on India…. In the situation of an agreement which applied to every stated then logically India would have had to think about it" (The New York times, 1974).

Indo-Pak Nuclear Struggle

The very first nuclear series of explosions in the South Asia region by India gave a catastrophic shock to Pakistan. According to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, India had developed nuclear capability at a great cost, in the environment

of high risk and at countless sacrifices just to blackmail Pakistan. "The political motive of the nuclear tests was to dominate over subcontinent and to enjoy its hegemony over the neighboring states" (Baqai, 2016). Pakistan declared the India's action as the biggest threat to its security and decided to make its nuclear bomb.

Sagan's nuclear security model underscored the states' desire for control on nuclear arsenals to prevent unintended consequences regarding their nuclear rival states. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated the Project-706 to manufacture the nuclear bomb in the response of India's nuclear tests. Bhutto was conscious about the United States interests in non-proliferation but he claimed that the nuclear threat from the neighboring country was non-negotiable for the security of Pakistan. He gave a speech in the national assembly and claimed that Pakistan needed to secure its borders brought a quality shift in the foreign policy. Pakistan was well informed that the future of this region was crowned with nuclear threats and security problems (Baqai, 2016).

In contrast, India's nuclear weapons program got on a slowed pace. The most important factor behind this was the international pressure to halt the exceeding nuclear proliferation in the world in the late 70s. After the explosion, India had to face major criticism from its nuclear technology supplier groups like USA and Canada (Sethi, 2014). They hammered India with multiple bans on the supply of nuclear technology and the sale of nuclear fuel. India wanted to be a member of a recognized nuclear states group and the supplier of nuclear technology to other states. On the other side 1975 nuclear weapons states decided to establish an organization with the name of 'Nuclear Supplier Group' (NSG) to limit the sale of nuclear weapons technology to the states that didn't hold it. However, India was not part of this organization. Despite India's arguments against the unjust NSG agreement and bans, India had to slow down its program to weaponry the device design (Bano, 2015). Nevertheless, in 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and the USA funded Pakistan to counter this invasion. India saw this alliance as a challenge to its national security and said that Pakistan would use these funds for nuclear technology against India.

In March 1983, Pakistan conducted a series of successful cold tests with the code name 'Kirana-I'. These tests were based on the nuclear device without fissile material (Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2018). In the meantime, Pakistan and China moved closer together against India. In the late 1980s, China provided direct crucial assistance to Pakistani scientists on the nuclear program. (Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2018) The China-Pakistan closer ties pushed the nuclear program of India ahead. In response, India built her first ballistic missile named Prithvi with the capability of reaching targets in Pakistan and China.

By answering non-proliferation organizations at the international level, in 1988, Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister, addressed the United Nations General Assembly, he suggested a comprehensive action plan (Dikshit, 2010). According to him, to activate a nonviolent and nuclear-weapon-free world, all the states had to de-weaponize their nukes collectively and that seemed impossible.

On the contrary, in May 1990, China did also a proxy test of the uranium implosion bomb for Pakistan on its land. (Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2018) In 1995, the Narasimha Rao government gave the green signal to work on nuclear tests but the project was caught by the United States intelligence. As a result, India had to

postpone its plan under foreign pressure. (Singh, 2021) In 1996, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came to ban non-nuclear power to acquire nuclear weapons. India strongly refused to sign this treaty (Perkovich, 1999). India chose neither to be part of NPT nor CTBT and labeled them as discriminatory treaties.

Nuclear South Asia 1998

The first nuclear test of India was merely a technological demonstration. India wanted to give the message to China and Pakistan that India could create her own nuclear weapons. At that time, nuclear technology was not either weaponized nor had any delivery system. Now, Indian Policy Makers felt the need to advance its nuclear technology to thermonuclear technology based on fusion devices. In addition, there was a challenge to make smaller tactical devices for real-world applications.

On May 11, 1998, under the right-wing nationalist party government, BJP, India moved forward towards the Pukhran-II tests. It was in the manifesto of the BJP that India must have her own nuclear weapons for national security in the South Asia region. At that time, Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh had a concept of "Nuclear Apartheid": the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots (Singh, 1998). According to him the nuclear have states definitely threaten the nuclear have not's states and their foreign policy would remain under the spell of nuclear have states.

The second secret operation was given the name of 'Operation Shakti'. The specific operation was based on five nuclear explosions and conducted at the Indian Army's Pokhran Test Range. One of the five detonations was a fusion bomb, however, the rest of the four were categorically fission bombs. On May 11, 1998, India conducted three successful nuclear tests, followed by two more nuclear tests on May 13 1998 (Perkovich, 1999). The Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, declared India as a 'full-fledged nuclear state' through a short press conference. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan conducted six successful nuclear explosions. At this point, South Asia had hosted two nuclear power states, India and Pakistan. The high-security concerns by adversaries dragged both states into the new world of nuclear deterrence.

Conclusion

According to Sagan's Nuclear Security Model, the acquisition of nuclear power by states for security purposes was very complex. The model enlightened different situations and reasons to acquire the most destructive weapons like nuclear bombs. He said that the compound of political, strategic, and above all security matters of the nation led states on the journey of manufacturing nuclear warlords to counter the deterrence of credible enemies. Certain situations could have pushed a state towards the quest of hard power for the sake of national security. The essence of the national security dilemma was for a state to secure the vital interests of nation against her adversary power. While talking about the nuclear journey of India, we reached on a conclusion that India had to get through three different stages aimed achieving its goal. The primarily concern of the policy makers remained national security. From 1947 to the1960, the security policy of India was defensive and more vocal about the non-proliferation of nuclear technology. At the time, Nehru claimed that the policy of India was coated with progressive approach and totally opposed the military line of thinking. He was the strong advocate the policy of non-alignment,

disarmament, peaceful coexistence, and peaceful dispute settlement at international level.

The second phase of nuclear journey, from 1960s to 1974, was based on the security concerns. The Sino-India war 1962 and China's successful nuclear experiments 1964 supported the major shift in security policy of India. The war with Pakistan 1965 left more scars on the national integrity of India. The opposition fueled the debate in public to have India's own nuclear bomb. China as an emerging nuclear power and her alignment with Pakistan swallowed Nehru's classic moral politics. The war on two fronts, China and Pakistan, made Indian foreign policymakers more eager to maximize security which led to shaping nuclear bombs. The first radical change was brought by Indira Gandhi in security policy of India. Later on, her belief in hardcore policies ensured the national interest of India. The speculation about Sino-Pakistan alliance against India formulated the decision of manufacturing nuclear weapons for security purpose. In 1974, India grabbed the attention of International world by the successful explosion of nuclear tests. The demonstration of nuclear power strength made the world more anxious in the wake of nuclear proliferation concerns. In results, India had to face the sanctions and bans on its sale of nuclear technology. This particular situation became the reason of slower down the nuclear journey of India. The final phase of nuclear program started from 1974 to 1998, this phase included the hardships as well as achievements to date regarding its program. During this phase, India had to deal with the international sanctions, Pakistan and the United States alliance at the time of Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan and Pakistan-China coalition on nuclear technology information. These events escalated the confidence of India to take further steps in the advancement of nuclear weapons technology. In 1998, with the series of successful nuclear tests, India achieved her nuclear ambition and justified as security bomb. As in international relations, there are no permanent friends or foes but only permanent interests. The entire struggle should be done to secure national interests.

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